



Secret Sharing through Cellular Automata

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One-Dimensional Cellular Automata (CA)

Definition


One-dimensional cellular automaton: triple $\langle n, r, f \rangle$ where $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is the number of cells arranged on a one-dimensional array, $r \in \mathbb{N}$ is the radius and $f : \{0, 1\}^{2r+1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is the local rule.

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Example: $n = 8$, $r = 1$, $f(s_{i-1}, s_i, s_{i+1}) = s_{i-1} \oplus s_i \oplus s_{i+1}$ (Rule 150)




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Remark: No boundary conditions \Rightarrow The array “shrinks”



Secret Sharing Schemes (SSS)

- ▶ **Secret sharing scheme**: a procedure enabling a **dealer** to share a **secret** S among a set \mathcal{P} of n **players**
- ▶ In (k, n) **threshold schemes**, at least k players out of n are required to recover S

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Example: $(2, 3)$ -scheme



Bipermutive Rules

- ▶ Rule $f : \{0, 1\}^{2r+1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is called **bipermutive** if there exists $g : \{0, 1\}^{2r-1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that:

$$f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{2r}, x_{2r+1}) = x_1 \oplus g(x_2, \dots, x_{2r}) \oplus x_{2r+1}$$

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$$p = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline ? & ? & ? & ? & 0 & 1 & ? & ? \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$c = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

(a) Initialization

$$p = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$c = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

(b) Complete preimage

Figure : Example with bipermutive rule 150


Basic (n, n) Secret Sharing Scheme - Setup Phase

1. The *dealer* D sets the secret S as an m -bit configuration of a CA, and selects a bipermutive rule of radius r such that $2r|m$




Basic (n, n) Secret Sharing Scheme - Setup Phase

- D evolves the CA backwards for $T = m(n-1)/2r$ iterations, randomly choosing an initial $2r$ -bit block at each step




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
Basic (n, n) Secret Sharing Scheme - Setup Phase

3. After $T = m(n-1)/2r$ iterations, the dealer splits the resulting preimage in n blocks of m bits




Basic (n, n) Secret Sharing Scheme - Setup Phase

4. D securely sends one block to each player and publishes the bipermutive rule used




Basic (n, n) Secret Sharing Scheme - Recovery Phase

1. The n players pool their shares in the correct order to get the complete preimage of the CA




Basic (n, n) Secret Sharing Scheme - Recovery Phase

- The players evolve the CA forward, using the local rule published by the dealer




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
Basic (n, n) Secret Sharing Scheme - Recovery Phase

3. The configuration obtained after $T = m(n-1)/2r$ iterations is the secret S .




Secret Juxtaposition (1/4)

1. Append a copy of the secret S to the right of the final CA image




Secret Juxtaposition (2/4)

- Update the preimages by completing them rightwards (note that it is not necessary to pick extra random bits)




Secret Juxtaposition (3/4)

- Update the preimages by completing them rightwards (note that it is not necessary to pick extra random bits)



Secret Juxtaposition (4/4)

3. The last preimage contains an additional block for the new player. The sets $\{P_1, \dots, P_k\}$ and $\{P_2, \dots, P_{k+1}\}$ can recover S




Access Structure of the Scheme

- ▶ (k, n) -**sequential threshold**: at least k **consecutive** shares are necessary to recover the secret
- ▶ By continuing to append copies of the secret, the shares will eventually repeat \Rightarrow **cyclic** access structure


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What about real threshold schemes with CA?

A Different Angle: Latin Squares

Definition

A *Latin square* of order N is a $N \times N$ matrix L from such that every row and every column are permutations of $[N] = \{1, \dots, N\}$

1	3	4	2
4	2	1	3
2	4	3	1
3	1	2	4

Orthogonal Latin Squares

Definition

Two Latin squares L_1 and L_2 of order n are *orthogonal* if their superposition yields all the pairs $(x, y) \in [N] \times [N]$.

1	3	4	2
4	2	1	3
2	4	3	1
3	1	2	4

(a) L_1

1	4	2	3
3	2	4	1
4	1	3	2
2	3	4	1

(b) L_2

1,1	3,4	4,2	2,3
4,3	2,2	1,4	3,1
2,4	4,1	3,3	1,2
3,2	1,3	2,1	4,4

(c) (L_1, L_2)

A set of n pairwise orthogonal Latin squares is denoted as n -MOLS

$(2, n)$ -Schemes through n -MOLS

1. The dealer D chooses a row $S \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ as the secret


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
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Example: $(2, 3)$ -scheme, $S = 3$

$(2, n)$ -Schemes through n -MOLS


2. D randomly selects a column $j \in \{1, \dots, N\}$



Example: $S = 3, j = 2$

$(2, n)$ -Schemes through n -MOLS


3. The value of $L_i(S, j)$ for $i \in [n]$ is the share of P_i



Example: $(2, 3)$ -scheme, $S = 3$, $j = 2$, $B_1 = 1$, $B_2 = 3$, $B_3 = 4$

$(2, n)$ -Schemes through n -MOLS


4. Since L_i, L_k are orthogonal, (B_i, B_k) uniquely identify (S, j)



Example: $(2, 3)$ -scheme, $B_1 = 1, B_2 = 3 \Rightarrow (3, 2)$

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
4. Since L_i, L_k are orthogonal, (B_i, B_k) uniquely identify (S, j)



Example: $(2, 3)$ -scheme, $B_2 = 3, B_3 = 4 \Rightarrow (3, 2)$

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Example: $(2, 3)$ -scheme, $B_1 = 1, B_3 = 4 \Rightarrow (3, 2)$

Latin Squares through Bipermutive CA

- ▶ **Problem reduction:** determine which CA induce orthogonal Latin squares

Lemma



Let $\langle 2m, r, t, f \rangle$ be a bipermutive CA with $2r|m$. Then, the CA generates a Latin square of order $N = 2^m$

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(a) Rule 150

1	4	3	2
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(b) L_{150}

$00 \mapsto 1, 10 \mapsto 2, 01 \mapsto 3, 11 \mapsto 4$

- ▶ Local rule: **linear combination** of the neighborhood cells

$$f(x_0, \dots, x_{2r}) = a_0 x_0 \oplus \dots \oplus a_{2r} x_{2r} \quad , \quad a_i \in \mathbb{F}_2$$

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- ▶ Associated polynomial:

$$f \mapsto P_f(X) = a_0 + a_1 X + \dots + a_{2r} X^{2r}$$

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- ▶ Global rule: $m \times (m + 2r)$ $2r$ -diagonal **transition matrix**

$$M_F = \begin{pmatrix} a_0 & \cdots & a_{2r} & 0 & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & a_0 & \cdots & a_{2r} & 0 & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & 0 & a_0 & \cdots & a_{2r} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$x = (x_0, \dots, x_{n-1}) \mapsto M_F x^T$$

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$$x = (x_0, \dots, x_{n-1}) \mapsto M_F x^T$$

- ▶ $a_0, a_{2r} \neq 0 \Rightarrow f$ bipermutive

Theorem

The Latin squares induced by $\langle 2m, r, t, f \rangle$ and $\langle 2m, r, t, g \rangle$ are orthogonal if and only if $\gcd(P_f(X), P_g(X)) = 1$

Orthogonal Latin Squares by Linear CA

Theorem

The Latin squares induced by $\langle 2m, r, t, f \rangle$ and $\langle 2m, r, t, g \rangle$ are orthogonal if and only if $\gcd(P_f(X), P_g(X)) = 1$

1	4	3	2
2	3	4	1
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3	2	1	4

(a) Rule 150

1	2	3	4
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4	3	2	1

(b) Rule 90





1,1	4,2	3,3	2,4
2,2	3,1	4,4	1,3
4,3	1,4	2,1	3,2
3,4	2,3	1,2	4,1

(c) Superposition

Figure : $P_{150}(X) = 1 + X + X^2$, $P_{90}(X) = 1 + X^2$ (coprime)

Conclusions and Perspectives

- ▶ Recap:
 - ▶ A single bipermutive CA can be used to implement a (k, n) sequential threshold scheme
 - ▶ A set of n linear CA with coprime rules gives rise to a set of n MOLS (and thus to a $(2, n)$ -threshold scheme)
- ▶ Future developments:
 - ▶ Count (and build!) pairs of coprime polynomials
 - ▶ Generalise to higher threshold (using orthogonal hypercubes)

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